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The "Created by His Seller" Limitation
of Section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C.: A Provision in
Need of an Articulated Policy
WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE*
INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators for years have been confused about the policy
that underlies the "created by his seller" language of section 9-307(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Courts most often simply apply the statutory
provision in a mechanical fashion without any attempt to address the policy
considerations.' Occasionally they have complained that the clause creates
an unjust result that is nevertheless dictated by the statute;2 a few courts
have even implied that the provision should be circumvented.' Several schol-
ars have vigorously attacked the provision as unsound and unjustifiable, 4
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his colleagues, Professors Phillip J. Closius and William M. Richman, University of Toledo
College of Law, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to recognize
the able research assistance of Mr. Kenneth Direktor, third-year law student, University of
Toledo. The University of Toledo supported this project through a Faculty Research Grant.
1. E.g., National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967);
Muir v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 586, 262 A.2d 33 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970);
Lindsley v. Financial Collection Agencies, Inc., 97 Misc. 2d 263, 410 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
2. "We recognize that the result which flows from this construction of the statute may
seem unjust. . . . However, this is consistent with the general rule set forth in the
Code. . . .Furthermore, our holding is in accord with the decisions rendered in other states
... ." Martin Bros. Implement Co. v. Diepholz, 109 II1. App. 3d 283, 290, 440 N.E.2d 320,
325, (1982).
This court recognizes that this is a harsh result, since the purchaser ... had no
means to learn .. . that the property he purchased was subject to a security
interest. It may be that legislative action is necessary to prevent such results in
the future. Since we are bound by enacted laws . . . no other course is open to
us here.
Exchange Bank v. Jarrett, 180 Mont. 33, 39, 588 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1979). "[I]f a hardship
results from our interpretation, it is for the Legislature to remove it." General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Troville, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 409 (Mass. App. 1969).
3. E.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Western Crane & Rigging Co., 184 Neb. 212, 166
N.W.2d 409 (1969) (dicta); Adams v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 565 P.2d 26 (Okla. 1977);
Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction, Inc., 205 Pa. Super. 154, 208 A.2d 290
(1965) (dicta).
4. Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 46 U. CoLo. L. REv. 333, 347, 364 (1975) ("difficult to perceive any compelling
justification for the prevailing interpretation of the created-by-his-seller language in Section 9-
307()"; "senseless" provision); Knapp, Protecting the Buyer of Previously Encumbered Goods:
Another Plea for Revision of UCC Section 9-307(1), 15 Aiz. L. Rav. 861, 864 (1973) (results
produced are "wrong"); Vernon, Priorities, The Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer
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but most commentators, like the courts, either have avoided discussion of
the policy 5 or have indicated uncertainty about the underlying rationale.6
Section 9-307(1) governs priorities in goods between secured parties and
buyers in ordinary course of business. 7 The subsection in its entirety provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201)
other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence.8
Financing, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 531, 536 (1963) (results produced are "unjustifiable
and improper"); Special Project, The Priority Rules of Article 9, 62 CORNELL L. Rav. 834,
963 (1977) ("requirement is difficult to justify") [hereinafter cited as Special Project]; Comment,
Section 9-307(1) of the U. C. C.: The Scope of the Protection Given a Buyer in Ordinary Course
of Business, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 985, 989 (1968) ("apparent anomaly") [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Scope of Protection]. Three of these commentators have recommended
deletion of the "created by his seller" language from section 9-307(1). Knapp, supra, at 892;
Vernon, supra, at 546; Comment, Scope of Protection, supra, at 996.
5. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 26.6-.12 (1965); R.
HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2d ed. 1979); A. ScHWARTZ & R. SCOTr,
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIS 597-608 (1982).
6. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 1075 (2d ed. 1980) ("Why the drafters were more protective of the secured creditor's
interest in 9-307 than of an owner's equity in 2-403, we cannot say."); Special Project, supra
note 4, at 963 ("Perhaps this result can be justified.").
Professors Jackson and Kronman have observed that "the analytical justification for many
of article 9's most important priority rules remains obscure." Jackson & Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1144 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Jackson & Kronman, Priorities Among Creditors]. These authors previously made a similar
observation which, while directed toward the preference of purchase money secured parties, is
equally applicable in this context: "[t]he economic or jurisprudential rationale for the existence
of that preference has never been explored fully." Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing
Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1, 2 n.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Jackson & Kronman, Financing Buyer].
7. The term "buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined in section 1-201(9) which
reads:
''Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a
pawnbroker. All persons who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at
wellhead or minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the business of selling
goods of that kind. "Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property
or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of
title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk
or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978). Reading the definition in conjunction with the last clause of section
9-307(1) makes it clear that a buyer can still qualify for protection against the security interest
even with knowledge of the existence of the security interest, but that the status of "buyer in
ordinary course of business" and the protection that goes with that status is lost when the
buyer knows that the sale violates the terms of the security agreement.
8. "This section states when buyers of goods take free of a security interest even though
perfected. A buyer who takes free of a perfected security interest of course takes free of an
unperfected one." Id. § 9-307(1) comment 1.
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Since the qualifying buyer must buy "in ordinary course from a person in
the business of selling goods of that kind," 9 section 9-307(1) applies to
buyers purchasing frbim the inventory of dealers.
The consequences of applying the "created by his seller" language can be
illustrated by comparing two typical cases. Assume a secured party takes a
security interest in the inventory'0 of a dealer-debtor. A buyer in ordinary
course who purchases from that inventory will take free of the security
interest since the security interest was "created by his seller" (the dealer-
debtor). In the other case the debtor is not a dealer. The secured party
finances non-inventory collateral such as equipment" or consumer goods,'
2
and the debtor wrongfully sells it to a dealer who sells the same kind of
goods. A subsequent buyer from the dealer may qualify as a buyer in ordinary
course, but the buyer cannot take free of the security interest because it was
not "created by his seller."
Although wooden application of the clause has led the courts to the correct
result in most cases, the paucity of policy analysis in the reported opinions
has left a deficient legacy in the interpretation of section 9-307(1). "The
task of the judges is ... to implement the legislative will and help it achieve
its goal."' 3 By practicing "mechanical jurisprudence"'' 4 with a statutory
provision whose application is clear in most cases,' 5 judges may satisfy their
task of implementing the will of the legislature, but they cannot advance
the goal of the statute when they continually neglect to identify the goal.'
6
For analysis of the farm products provision of section 9-307(1) see Dolan, Section 9-
307(1): The UCC's Obstacle to Agricultural Commerce in the Open Market, 72 Nw. U.L. REv.
706 (1977).
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978).
10. In this context, "inventory" is goods "held by a person who holds them for sale or
lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them. Id.§ 9-109(4).
11. "Equipment" is essentially goods "used or bought for use primarily in business." Id.
§ 1-109(2).
12. "Consumer goods" are goods "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family
or household purposes." Id. § 9-109(1).
13. W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 196 (1980).
14. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908).
15. "The phrase 'created by his seller' is a key limitation upon the operation of section
9-307(1) that cannot be easily manipulated or interpreted away." Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary
Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (And Related Matters),
1974 Wis. L. REv. 7.
16.
A final explanation for the reasoned opinion requirement comes from the value
of the judge's exploration-for himself, in writing, for review by a critical au-
dience-of his own analytic processes. Richard Wasserstrom, in his illuminating
book, The Judicial Decision (1961), called this the "process of justification", one
that insures that the opinion be as accurate as possible, and the conduct undertaken
as beneficial as possible. Thus, the requirement of a reasoned opinion also tried
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The words of many statutory provisions, including the one that is the subject
of this article, do not alone convey the goals they are designed to achieve.' 7
Courts in such instances must look beyond the mere words to the context
of their adoption in order to construe the statute in ways that will achieve
its legislative purpose.' 8 The Uniform Commercial Code itself mandates a
"purpose" approach 9 to its application. Section 1-102(1) provides that the
Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies." 20
The deficiency of judicial opinions decided in a policy vacuum becomes
most apparent when cases arise that do not fit into the typical patterns
described earlier. 2' For example, when cases arise in which articles 2 and 9
overlap, 22 it is impossible to reconcile fully all of the statutory commands
to force a judge to "think," rather than merely to "react," in order best to
explain himself to his public. Wasserstrom differentiated what he styled "the
process of discovery" from that of justification. The distinction is important, for
it focuses attention on the need to articulate and explain a result, no matter how
that result was "discovered".
W. REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 59-60.
17. "[Ilt is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
their meaning." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
18.
[Courts] should give sympathetic attention to indications in the legislative history
of the lines of contemplated growth, if the history is available. It should give
weight to popular construction of self-operating elements of the statute, if that
is uniform. Primarily, it should strive to develop a coherent and reasoned pattern
of applications intelligibly related to the general purpose.
2 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND THE
APPLICATION OF LAW 1417 (1958).
19. Professors Hart and Sacks have been influential in developing the purposive approach
to judicial process.
In interpreting a statute a court should:
1. Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate
provision of it which may be involved; and then
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out
the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the words
either-
(a) a meaning they will not bear, or
(b) a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear statement.
Id. at 1411.
20. The official comment elaborates even further on this principle of statutory construction:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and
policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and
policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and
the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the
case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1, para. 4 (1978).
21. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
22.
One transaction that recurrently crosses article lines is a contract for the sale of
goods that can either become, or come into confrontation with, a security interest
.... The difference in orientation between Articles 2 and 9 is pervasive. There is
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and official comments that direct their interrelationship. 23 Stripped of a
policy basis for decisionmaking, judges are left impotent to decide these
cases rationally. 2A However, if the statutory policy is discerned for the typical,
relatively straightforward case, it will then be available to resolve cases raising
more difficult questions. 2
This article is based on the premise that the "created by his seller" language
of section 9-307(1) is supported by a sound, legitimate policy. Part I artic-
ulates that policy by analyzing section 9-307(1) in the context of other article
9 provisions and analogous principles of agency law. Part II provides a two-
prong evaluation of the policy. The first prong addresses the arguments of
commentators who have attacked the provision as unjustifiable and have
urged repeal of the clause on consumer protection grounds. The second
prong is a risk-allocation analysis that rejects loss prevention and loss spread-
ing as alternative policies for allocating losses between secured parties and
buyers in ordinary course. Part III is an application of the policy articulated
in part I to four fact patterns in which 'policy analysis is essential to assure
a proper outcome. It shows that even though correct results may be achieved
in many cases through mechanical application, situations inevitably will arise
that fall between the cracks.
I. ARTICULATION OF THE POLICY
The rationale underlying the "created by his seller" language in section
9-307(1) can be ascertained by examining the provisions of the Code that
section 9-307(1) affects and some analogous principles of agency law. Section
9-307(1) enables a buyer in ordinary course of business (essentially a good
faith buyer from the inventory stock of a dealer) to take free of certain
security interests. For these buyers the section provides one of two exceptions
to the general rule that a security interest continues in collateral notwith-
some attempt at accommodation in the principal bridging section, section 9-113,
but that section, while acknowledging the likelihood that commercial transactions
will encounter inconsistent regulation under the two articles, offers guidance that
is too skeletonic and imprecise to resolve the varieties of conflict that regularly
arise. Nowhere else is there a systematic effort to mesh the two articles or to
cope with their differing orientations and styles.
Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent
Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YA.E L.J.
907, 908-09 (1978).
23. Consider the relationship of the following UCC provisions: section 9-307(1); section
9-201 ("Except as otherwise provided by this Act"); section 9-306(2) ("Except where this Article
otherwise provides"); section 9-307 comment 1, para. 2; section 2-403(1), (2), (4); section 2-
403 comment 2, para. I and the last sentence of para. 2; and section 2-402(3)(a).
24. One author has referred to judges who engage in mechanical jurisdiction as "sterile"
judges. Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. REv. 977, 979 (1972).
25. "The purpose of statute [sic] must always be treated as including not only an immediate
purpose or group of related purposes but a larger and subtler purpose as to how the particular
statute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole." H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 18,
at 1414.
19841
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
standing its sale or other disposition. 26 The "created by his seller" language,
however, limits the scope of this exception. The policy supporting the lim-
itation is tied to the rationales underlying the general rule and its two
exceptions in the context of sales of goods. 27 It is also revealed through
consideration of several fundamental provisions of agency law that have
been largely overlooked in the context of article 9 interpretation. 28
A. Examination of U.C.C. Provisions
Article 9 establishes the general validity of security agreements between
the immediate parties and against third parties. Section 9-201 broadly rec-
ognizes the effectiveness of a security agreement "according to its terms
between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against credi-
tors." 29 The protection of secured parties is similarly advanced by the section
9-306(2) provision that "a security interest continues in collateral notwith-
standing sale, exchange or other disposition thereof. .... ,,30 Without assur-
ances as to the basic validity and priority of their secured interests, lenders
either would not be willing to engage in secured financing or would lend
only at higher interest rates. 3' Therefore, this principle of the general validity
of security interests, even though subject to numerous exceptions provided
in the Code, 32 is crucial to the practical success of secured financing.
26. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978).
27. The text of the official comments to section 9-307(1) is not enlightening on the policy
of the limitation in subsection (1). It does not discuss the purpose of limiting the buyer's
protection to security interests created by the buyer's seller. An observation by Professor Gilmore
is relevant to the policy pursuit: "For an understanding of Article 9 it is essential to realize
that almost all of its specific content-the detail and verbiage of its fifty sections-was a faithful
copying-out of historical models. Almost nothing new was added." Gilmore, Security Law,
Formalism and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REv. 659, 671 (1968). For discussion of relevant pre-
Code statutes, see infra notes 40 and 52.
28. A few commentators have identified the estoppel and agency doctrinal roots to the
codification of section 2-403(2) (provision in article 2 on sales of goods protecting the buyer
in the ordinary course of business). Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept
of Possession in the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1147, 1170-71 (1978);
Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057-60 (1954);
Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI.
L. REV. 469, 470-75 (1963). These authors, however, do not focus on the relationship of agency
law principles to the provisions of section 9-307(1). For an explanation of the relationship
between section 2-403(1) and (2) and section 9-307(1), see infra notes 78-101 and accompanying
text.
29. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978).
30. Id. § 9-306(2).
31. "The ultimate reason for a secured party's taking a security interest is to give him
assurance that in the event the debtor does not or cannot pay, the secured party will be able
to realize the indebtedness due to him out of the collateral." Coogan, A Suggested Analytical
Approach to Article 9 of the U. C. C., 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 2 (1963). See also Baird & Jackson,
Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 175
(1983).
32. See the priority provisions of sections 9-301, 9-304(2), 9-306(5), 9-307 through 9-310,
and 9-312 through 9-316.
[Vol. 60:73
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 9-306(2) itself includes an exception to its basic rule that governs
most of the cases involving sales of goods from the financed inventory stock
of a dealer. The security interest does not continue in the collateral sold
when the sale has been authorized by the secured party 3 Commonly the
parties to the security agreement envision payment by the debtor-dealer from
the proceeds of sales of the encumbered inventory;3 4 and section 9-306(2)
provides for automatic attachment of the security interest to any identifiable
proceeds received by the debtor.3" The severence of the security interest in
collateral authorized to be sold is based on the concept of waiver. 36 The
lender relinquishes the security interest in the collateral and looks to the
proceeds of the sale to satisfy the debt.
Section 9-307(1) establishes the second exception to the continuance of a
security interest in goods sold from the financed inventory stock of a dealer.
The section protects buyers in ordinary course of business even when the
debtor makes an unauthorized sale.3 7 Private agreements between the secured
party and the debtor that either prohibit or condition the sale of the collateral
are not given effect against a qualified buyer.38 To qualify for this exception,
the buyer must purchase "from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind"; 39 thus, section 9-307(1) applies to sales from debtors' inventories. 40
33. "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized
by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise. . . ." U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978).
34. Proceeds are defined in the Code to include "whatever is received upon the sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." Id. § 9-306(1).
35. "[A] security interest . . . also continues in any identifiable proceeds including col-
lections received by the debtor." Id. § 9-306(2).
36. Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank, 426 F.2d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 1970).
37.
The limitations which this section imposes on the persons who may take free
of a security interest apply of course only to unauthorized sales by the debtor.
If the secured party has authorized the sale in the security agreement or otherwise,
the buyer takes free without regard to the limitations of this section.
U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 2, para. 2 (1978).
38.
[T]he security agreement may contain restrictions on the time, place or manner
of sale, the persons to whom sales are permitted, or the handling of proceeds
from such sales. It may also provide that any sale shall be deemed unauthorized
if made when the debtor is in default under some provision of the security
agreement (which would of course include the obligation of repayment, but might
also refer to other duties, such as the proper storage and handling of goods, the
furnishing of sales reports or the payment over of proceeds).
Knapp, supra note 4, at 874.
39. The language quoted in the text is part of the definition of "buyer in ordinary course
of business." U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978). For the complete text of the definition, see supra note
7.
40. The comments to section 9-307 indicate that the "prior uniform statutory provisions"
are section 9 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and section 9(2) of the Uniform Trust
1984]
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This exception to the general rule of validity of security agreements against
third parties reflects the desire to remove obstacles that would unduly impede
the free flow of commerce in goods. 41 When buying in ordinary course
through established business channels, buyers rely upon the integrity of the
marketplace to pass them good title. 42 Customers who buy goods from the
inventory of debtor-dealers are relieved by section 9-307(1) of the burden
of checking the filing system for public notices of security interests in the
goods. 43 To require otherwise would unduly impede the free flow of com-
merce in goods because of the number of these purchases and because most
secured parties financing inventory actually authorize sales of the collateral
by their debtors. 4
Section 9-307(1), however, does not cut off all security interests in favor
of buyers in ordinary course. The buyer will prevail only if the security
interest is "created by his seller." The draftsmen's objective of protecting
the buyer's reliance on the integrity of the marketplace was not absolutely
adhered to because buyers rely on the appearance of authority for merchants
to sell stocked goods, irrespective of whether the merchant-seller was the
party who created the security interest. The reasoning behind the "created
by his seller" limitation thus cannot be discerned by comparing the trans-
actional perspectives of protected and unprotected buyers in ordinary course.
Rather the differing results under section 9-307(1) depend upon the actions
of the secured party and upon the business status of the debtor. The buyer
$
Receipts Act. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was concerned with transactions in goods
now described in the UCC as purchase money security interests that are taken or retained by
the seller of the goods to secure their price. See U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1978). Section 9 was
concerned essentially with conditional sales of inventory. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act dealt
with inventory financing. It was the forerunner to the UCC purchase money security interest
in which the secured party provides an enabling loan for the debtor to acquire the collateral.
See id. § 9-107(b).
41. In a report to the New York Law Revision Commission, the Special Committee on
the Uniform Commercial Code of Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc.,
specifically approved "[tihe policy of the free movement of goods expressed in Section 9-307(1)
.... 2 LAw REVISION COMM'N, REPORT 1018 (1954).
42. Section 9-307(1) "encourages the marketability of goods" and "supports the reliance
interest of buyers who assume that they have clear title to the goods they purchase." B. CLARK,
THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3.4, at 3-18
(1980). See also Knapp, supra note 4, at 887; Comment, Scope of Protection, supra note 4,
at 990-91; Note, The Buyer-Secured Party Conflict and Section 9-307(1) of the UCC: Identifying
When a Buyer Qualifies for Protection as a Buyer in Ordinary Course, 50 FORDHAA L. REV.
657, 668-69 (1982).
43. Professor Gilmore has observed that the good faith purchaser "is protected not because
of his praiseworthy character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in
without elaborate investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property
by one who offers it for sale or to secure a loan." Gilmore, supra note 28, at 1057.
44. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW 226 (3d ed. 1981).
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in ordinary course prevails in cases of inventory financing in which the
secured party leaves the collateral in the hands of a person in the business
of selling goods of that kind. Yet, the secured party prevails when the
collateral is goods other than inventory, even if the debtor wrongfully passes
the goods to a dealer who sells to a buyer in ordinary course. Buyers rely
on their dealers' appearances in both cases, but section 9-307(1) mandates
differing results based essentially on the extent of the secured party's re-
sponsibility for creating the appearance.
The reason for the inclusion of the "created by his seller" language in
section 9-307(1) is now ascertainable. The language plays a crucial role in
the furtherance of the policy underlying section 9-307(1). It limits the ap-
plication of its exception favoring buyers to those cases in which the buyer
in ordinary course can establish apparent authority to sell.
A variety of factors help create apparent authority when a secured party
provides nonpossessory inventory financing. First, and foremost, entrusting
the collateral to debtors in the business of selling goods of the kind com-
prising the collateral facilitates sales in ordinary course because the secured
party entrusts the goods to a person with the inherent power to sell the
collateral directly to a buyer in ordinary course. In this context, the secured
party's responsibility is analogous to that of an entruster of goods to a
merchant under section 2-403(2). 45 A subsequent sale of the entrusted goods
conveys all of the entruster's rights to a buyer in ordinary course of business,
even if the sale violates the merchant's agreement with the entruster.46 Sim-
45. Professor Gilmore's development of the commercial or mercantile theory of good
faith purchase and Professor Warren's later study both discuss the application of the theory
to sales of goods.
The commerciality of the good faith purchase doctrine can be demonstrated by
a brief history of its growth in the law of sales of goods. The intangible evidences
of property, with which the balance of this article will be concerned, are by their
nature almost exclusively commercial. Goods, however, lead a double life: as
inventory, they are the subject matter of commercial transactions; as possessions,
the things we live by, they have passed out of the stream of commerce and come
to rest. Although Anglo-American law does not purport to distinguish between
commercial and non-commercial transactions, good faith purchase in the law of
sales has, in fact, a very different operation in the two cases.
Gilmore, supra note 28, at 1057.
The widespread acceptance of the Code represents substantial progress in the long
journey toward the attainment of a mercantile or commercial theory regarding
goods, documents and instruments .... The Code's inclusion of section 2-403,
granting a measure of negotiability to goods in a commercial setting, has been
the most dramatic step forward.
Warren, supra note 28, at 492. Interestingly, neither of the authors developed the relevance of
the commercial theory to the provisions of section 9-307(1).
46. "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
19841
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ilarly, financiers who entrust merchant-debtors with possession of inventory
collateral lose their security interests to buyers in ordinary course of business.
Second, the intended result of inventory financing is sale of the collateral
to third persons. 47 Given the active involvement in financing collateral in
which a sale is the intended result, the secured party rightly should lose the
security interest in the goods when the inevitable sale occurs. Finally, most
sales from a debtor's financed inventory are made pursuant to actual secured
party authorization. Section 9-307(1) is essentially a codification confirming
apparent authority to sell based on the regularity of business practice that
overrides even the secured party's express prohibition of sales of inventory
collateral. 4 By placing a debtor in possession of goods when the debtor is
in the business of selling goods of the same kind, the secured party vests
the debtor with indicia of apparent authority.
The basis for the debtor's apparent authority to sell is missing when the
collateral is goods other than inventory (such as equipment or consumer
goods). 49 Even if the secured party entrusts the debtor with possession. of
non-inventory collateral, the entrustment does not occur in a context in
which the debtor's only purpose for holding the goods is to sell them.
Additionally, the secured party's entrustment of possession is not an act
that empowers the debtor to sell to a buyer in ordinary course. By definition,
buyers in ordinary course must purchase from a seller in the business of
selling goods of the kind that are sold.5 0 Although a debtor's transfer of
the collateral to a dealer and its subsequent sale to a buyer in ordinary
course of business is foreseeable, it is not expected to happen. The transfer
of equipment and consumer goods, unlike inventory, is not anticipated and
generally is not allowed by secured parties.-"
The policy underlying the "created by his seller" language is thus dis-
coverable by examining the relationship between the two exceptions to the
business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978). "Entrusting" is defined to include "any delivery and any
acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties
to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or
the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal
law." Id. § 2-403(3).
47. "Inventory" consists of goods "held by a person who holds them for sale or lease
.... " Id. § 9-109(4).
48. Compare this codification with the concept of conclusive evidence that the retailer
had title or the right to convey embodied in section 9 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
See infra note 52.
49. See supra notes 11 and 12.
50. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978).
51. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS, & J. WHITE, supra note 44, at 114-15, 156-57.
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article 9 general rule of continued validity of security interests. It is a
limitation that serves to correlate the section 9-307(1) exception with the
more explicit authorization exception in section 9-306(2); secured party au-
thorization for the sale of the collateral, whether actual or apparent, is the
policy basis for discontinuing the security interest in the collateral after its
sale by the debtor.5 2
B. Examination of Agency Law Principles
Several agency law principles are analogous to the concepts codified in
section 9-307(1) and they should be recognized as valuable sources to explain
the policy reflected in the section. A debtor and a secured party generally
do not stand in an agent-principal relationship. 53 Nonetheless, agency law
principles are consistent with the "created by his seller" limitation. The
52. The prior statutory provisions cited in the official comments to section 9-307(1) reflect
the principles of entrustment, authorization, and estoppel that support the two exceptions which
cut off a security interest when encumbered goods are sold. See supra note 40. The Uniform
Conditional Sales Act § 9 provided:
When goods are delivered under a conditional sale contract and the seller expressly
or impliedly consents that the buyer may resell them prior to performance of the
condition, the reservation of property shall be void against purchasers from the
buyer for value in the ordinary course of business, and as to them the buyer shall
be deemed the owner of the goods, even though the contract or a copy thereof
shall be filed according to the provisions of this act.
The reference to express consent to resell correlates with U.C.C. § 9-306(2) authorization to
dispose of collateral, although the protection provided under the Code is broader since it extends
to all transferees and not just to buyers in ordinary course of business. The Commissioners'
notes to section 9 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act make clear the relationship between
the reference to implied consent and U.C.C. § 9-307(1): "That the goods have been put into
the retailer's stock with the consent of the wholesaler [the secured party] is conclusive evidence
that they are there for sale and that the retailer has title or the right to convey." UNIF.
CONIDmOIINAL SALES ACT § 9, 2 U.L.A. 16 (1922).
Section 9(2) of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is closely related to U.C.C. § 9-307(1). Section
9(2) provided that when the debtor has "liberty of sale and sells to a buyer in the ordinary
course of trade . . . such buyer takes free of the entruster's security interest in the goods so
sold, and no filing shall constitute notice of the entruster's security interest to such a buyer."
UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 9(2)(a)(i), 9C U.L.A. 255 (1957). Section 9(2)(c) elaborated on
the concept of "liberty of sale":
If the entruster consents to the placing of the goods subject to a trust receipt
transaction in the trustee's stock in trade or in his sales or exhibition rooms, or
allows such goods to be so placed or kept, such consent or allowance shall have
like effect as granting the trustee liberty of sale.
Id. § 9(2)(c), 9C U.L.A. 256.
53. "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by
one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act." RESTATEmmNT (SECotD) OF AGENCY § I(1) (1957). A debtor
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provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Agency dealing with the entrust-
ment of possession of a chattel to an agent demonstrate the relationship of
agency principles to the policy of section 9-307(1). Section 174 of the Res-
tatement indicates that an agent's possession of a chattel is not enough to
subject the entrusting principal to the loss of its interest;5 4 and, when au-
thority to sell the chattel is added to possession, section 175(1) provides that
the principal's interest is affected only by a transaction of the kind author-
ized. 5 Section 175(3), on the other hand, binds the principal who delivers
chattels to a dealer in such chattels to an unauthorized sale made to a person
acting in normal business practices under the reasonable belief that the dealer
may be under certain contractual controls of the secured party, but the debtor-dealer selling
inventory is acting on his own behalf and not on behalf of the secured party. "It is the element
of continuous subjection to the will of the principal which distinguishes the agent from other
fiduciaries and the agency agreement from other agreements." Id. § 1(I) comment b.
With the facility to take action that will cut off a security interest, the dealer-debtor has
what the Restatement (Second) of Agency refers to as a power, which it defines as "an ability
on the part of a person to produce a change in a given legal relation by doing or not doing
a given act." Id. § 6. The comments elaborate by pointing out that "[a]ll agents are power
holders but many power holders are not agents." Id. § 6 comment b, para. 2. Section 9-307(1)
creates a power holder because it essentially empowers a dealer-debtor to cut off the creditor's
security interest wrongfully.
54.
Aside from statute, a disclosed or partially disclosed principal who entrusts an
agent with the possession of a chattel, other than a commercial document rep-
resenting a chattel or chose in action, but who does not authorize him to sell it,
display it for sale, or otherwise affect the principal's interest in it, is not thereby
bound by an unauthorized transaction with reference to the chattel between the
agent and a third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 174 (1957).
The Comment to § 174 provides the following illustration:
P contracts to sell a horse to T. In execution of his promise P tells A to take
the horse to T, to whom he is to transfer possession and from whom he is to
receive the purchase price. Instead of doing as ordered, A sells the horse to X,
who reasonably believes A to be authorized. X acquires no title to the horse.
Id. § 174 comment a, illus. 3.
Section 200 of the Restatement provides a corresponding rule for entrustment by an un-
disclosed principal. The result under the rule is the same, but the language is changed slightly
to reflect the undisclosed principal situation: "an undisclosed principal . . . is not thereby
bound by a transaction with respect to the chattel between the agent and a third person who
believes the agent to be the owner." Id. § 200. For a discussion on the distinction between
disclosed and undisclosed principals, see infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
55.
Apart from statute, and except as stated in Subsection (3), the interests of a
disclosed or partially disclosed principal who entrusts an agent with the possession
of a chattel, other than a commercial document representing a chattel or chose
in action, with directions to deal with it in a particular manner, as by sale, barter,
pledge or mortgage, are not thereby affected by a transaction of a kind different
from that authorized.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 175(1) (1957).
The Comment to section 175(1) provides the following illustration:
P gives possession of an automobile to A, not a dealer, authorizing him to
display but not to sell it. Nevertheless, A sells it to T. In the absence of other
evidence, P is not bound by the sale.
Id. § 175(1) comment e, illus. 3.
Section 201(1) provides a corresponding rule for entrustment by an undisclosed principal.
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is authorized to sell the chattel. 56 The exception of subsection (3) requires
both entrustment to a dealer in the same kind of chattels and a purchase
in normal course.
The section 9-307(1) exception is similarly restricted. The "created.by his
seller" provision limits the secured party's vulnerability to those situations
in which the collateral is sold from the debtor-dealer's inventory stock. A
buyer in ordinary course of business correlates with a person buying in
normal business practices.
The Restatement draws a relevant distinction between disclosed and un-
disclosed principals.17 Restatement section 175(3) requires the buyer to rea-
sonably believe that the dealer is authorized to sell the chattel and thus
provides analogous support for recognition of the apparent authority con-
cept.5" However, apparent authority cannot be created by an undisclosed
principal, because the basis for the buyer's reasonable belief that the sale
was authorized is missing. 9 Restatement section 201(3) provides a similar
For discussion on the distinction between disclosed and undisclosed principals, see infra notes
57-63 and accompanying text.
56.
If the principal delivers a chattel to a dealer in such chattels to be sold or exhibited
for sale, an unauthorized sale of the chattel in accordance with the normal business
practices to one who reasonably believes the dealer to be authorized to sell the
chattel, binds the owner although the dealer was not authorized to sell it without
the consent of the owner, or was not authorized to sell it to the person to whom
it was sold, or at the price at which it was sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 175(3) (1957).
For the corresponding rule for an undisclosed principal, see id. § 201(3) and infra note 60.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) corresponds to Restatement § 175(3) since the Code section applies to
sales from debtors' inventories and goods are "inventory" "if they are held by a person who
holds them for sale or lease. ... ." U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1978). However, U.C.C § 9-307(1)
covers any entrustment of inventory collateral to the possession of a dealer, whereas Restatement
§ 175(3) requires the principal to deliver a chattel to a dealer. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) and (3) deletes
the requirement that the chattel be delivered to the dealer to be sold or exhibited for sale. Any
entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in that kind of goods gives the
merchant power to transfer all of the rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business. For an explanation of the relationship between U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) and 9-307(1), see
infra notes 78-101 and accompanying text.
57.
(I) If, at the time of a transaction conducted by an agent, the other party thereto
has notice thit the agent is acting for a principal and of the principal's identity,
the principal is a disclosed principal.
(2) If the other party has notice that the agent is or may be acting for a principal
but has no notice of the principal's identity, the principal for whom the agent is
acting is a partially disclosed principal.
(3) If the other party has no notice that the agent is acting for a principal, the
one for whom he acts is an undisclosed principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4 (1957).
A similar distinction applies to article 9 since a buyer in ordinary course may know that
the goods sold are collateral for a loan or may be completely unaware of any secured financing
arrangement.
58. "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another person by
transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in ac-
cordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 8 (1957).
59.
This follows necessarily from the fact that all representative authority in an agent
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rule for situations where chattels are entrusted to a dealer by an undisclosed
principal who does not authorize the sale of the chattels.60 The requirements
and the result under section 201(3) are identical with those of section 175(3),
except that rather than showing reasonable belief as to the dealer's authority,
the buyer must reasonably believe that the dealer is the owner. 61 If the buyer
establishes this reasonable belief, the owner is estopped from arguing un-
authorized disposition because the owner should know that entrustment of
goods to a dealer in such goods is likely to lead to detrimental reliance and
that a good faith purchase in the normal course of business provides such
reliance. 62 Sections 175(3) and 201(3) thus provide analogous theories for
terminating the security interests of both disclosed and undisclosed secured
parties .613
is derived from the objective consent of the principal to the third party, either
actual consent through the agent's permitted acts or apparent consent directly to
the third party. An undisclosed principal, being one whose agent poses as dealing
for himself, creates no direct appearances to the third party. Thus he can never
be charged with appearing to consent that his agent has a certain scope of
authority.
Conant, The Objective Theory of Agency: Apparent Authority and the Estoppel of Apparent
Ownership, 47 NEB. L. REV. 678, 686 (1968). "[Tlhe agent of an undisclosed principal, by
definition, never appears to be an agent." Id. at 691.
60.
If the principal delivers a chattel to a dealer in such chattels to be sold or
exhibited for sale, an unauthorized sale of the chattel by such dealer in accordance
with the normal business practices to one who reasonably believes the dealer to
be the owner, binds the owner, although the dealer was not authorized to sell it
without the consent of the owner or was not authorized to sell it to the person
to whom it was sold or at the price at which it was sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 201(3) (1957). For the corresponding rule for a disclosed
or partially disclosed principal, see id. § 175(3) and supra note 56.
61.
The undisclosed principal directs, permits or enables his agent in dealing with
third parties to pose as the owner of assets which in fact belong to the principal.
If third parties extend credit or purchase goods in reliance on the apparent
ownership of the agent, when the principal is ultimately responsible for causing
such appearance, the principal is estopped to deny contractual liability.
Conant, supra note 59, at 687.
62. The estoppel and apparent authority concepts are closely related in the context of
section 9-307(1). "In most of the situations in which apparent authority exists, estoppel also
exists although it is unnecessary as a basis for the principal's liability. If the claim of a party
to a transaction is based solely upon estoppel, he must prove a change of position which is
not required in the case of apparent authority." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B
comment b (1957). In the section 9-307(1) context, buyers in ordinary course will have changed
their position by making the purchase.
A long controversy has raged over whether apparent authority is true authority or creates
liability based on estoppel. See Cook, "Agency by Estoppel," 5 COLUM. L. REV. 36 (1905);
Cook, "Agency by Estoppel". A Reply, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 34 (1906); Ewart, "Agency by Estop-
pel," 5 CoLum. L. REv. 354 (1905). Compare Montrose, The Basis of the Power of an Agent
in Cases of Actual and Apparent Authority, 16 CAN. BAR REV. 757 (1938) with F. TIFFANY,
AGENCY § 16 (2d ed. 1924), and R. POWELL, LAW OF AGENCY 68-72 (2d ed. 1952).
63. Although the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Agency (§ 8A comment b
and § 175 comment a) indicate that the rules of sections 175(3) and 201(3) are illustrative of
an inherent agency power, the use of that concept is not appropriate in drawing analogies to
U.C.C. § 9-307(1). The term "inherent agency power" refers to power derived exclusively from
an agency relation when the power cannot be derived from apparent authority or estoppel
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The language of U.C.C. § 9-307(1) reflects both situations. A buyer in
ordinary course takes free of a security interest created by his seller "even
though the buyer knows of its existence." 64 Hence, the qualifying buyer is
protected whether or not the secured party is disclosed. The buyer, however,
cannot qualify with "knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods. ' 6 Similar
knowledge would serve to defeat a buyer under both section 175(3) and
section 201(3) of the Restatement. 6 With one exception, 67 the analysis that
follows does not draw upon the distinction between disclosed and undisclosed
secured parties; therefore, the discussion is generally limited to apparent
authority. 68
Thus, the policy underlying the "created by his seller" language is to limit
the exception to security interest validity codified in section 9-307(1) to cases
in which the secured party has clothed the debtor with the indicia of apparent
authority to sell the goods. Nonpossessory inventory financing establishes
apparent authority in dealer-debtors to sell to buyers in ordinary course
because (1) the intended result of inventory financing is sale of the collateral
to third persons, (2) the sale is facilitated by entrusting the collateral to
dealer-debtors in the business of selling goods of the kind comprising the
collateral, and (3) most of these sales are made pursuant to actual secured
party authorization. Debtor sales of consumer goods and equipment are
distinguishable. Improper sales of these categories of collateral generally do
not occur, nor are they expected to occur; therefore, secured parties have
been relieved of the burden of policing such sales. The absence of apparent
authority to sell is the justification for continuing the validity of the security
interest in such situations even against a buyer in ordinary course of business.
principles. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1957); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY 15 (1964). The absence of an agency relationship between the debtor and the
secured party makes the use of the agency term of "inherent agency power" inappropriate.
The use of the concepts of apparent authority and apparent ownership furthermore seems
preferable in utilizing analogous agency law principles to explain the underlying policy of section
9-307(1). Use of the term "inherent agency power" has been far from universal even in agency
law cases. "In many of the cases involving these situations the courts have rested liability upon
the ground of 'apparent authority', a phrase which has been used by the courts loosely."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A comment b, para. 3 (1957). "Whether or not the
term inherent agency power becomes part of the legal vocabulary will depend upon whether
the courts believe it to be the most appropriate term." W. SEAVEY, supra, at 16. Professor
Seavey had noted its use in only two cases. Cote Bros. v. Granite Lake Realty Corp., 105
N.H. 111, 193 A.2d 884 (1963); Holman-O.D. Baker Co. v. Pre-Design, Inc., 104 N.H. 116,
179 A.2d 454 (1962). For an argument against use of the term, see Conant, supra note 59.
64. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978).
65. Id. § 1-201(9). This knowledge would defeat the status of buyer in ordinary course of
business.
66. The buyer with this knowledge could not establish a reasonable belief that the seller
had authority to sell or was the owner of the goods.
67. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
68. For an explanation of how estoppel concepts underlie both apparent authority and
apparent ownership see supra note 62 and Conant, supra note 59.
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II. EVALUATION OF THE POLICY
A. Consumer Protection
Bona fide purchasers have become favorites of the law. Buyers in ordinary
course of business have paid value and have acted in good faith and without
knowledge of any impropriety concerning the sale. They have purchased in
established channels of trade where their expectations of legitimate sales
transactions are highest. "Both under pre-Code law and the Code itself, the
status of a buyer in ordinary course is as favorable as that accorded to any
third-party claimant. '69
Several commentators believe that the favored status of buyers in ordinary
course should allow them to prevail over all prior security interests and that
the limitation contained in section 9-307(1) is therefore unwarranted. 70 The
expectations of buyers in ordinary course are seen as equivalent, regardless
of whether or not the security interest was created by the dealer-seller. 7' The
buyer in either instance is innocent of any wrongdoing and lacks knowledge
that the sale is improper. The noncommercial buyer in either transaction is
likely to be unaware of the relevant commercial legal standards or even that
any risk is involved. Section 9-307(1) makes the buyers' rights depend entirely
on the prior actions of their sellers, of which they "almost certainly [have]
no knowledge, and over which [they] clearly [have] no control.' '72 Since the
expectations are equivalent and the equities are equally appealing in both
cases, protection arguably should be extended to buyers in ordinary course
who purchase from dealers who have not created the security interest in the
goods.73
Analysis of this argument is enhanced by examining a schema of the
component premises and conclusions. Argument I illustrates the reasoning
behind the consumer protectionists' view of the policy supporting the ex-
ception favoring buyers that is codified in section 9-307(1).
ARGUMENT I: (1) If Buyer in ordinary course purchases from a merchant
who has created a security interest in the goods purchased,
Buyer has no reason to expect that good title will not be
conveyed.
(2) Therefore, Buyer ought to take free of the security
interest.
69. Jackson & Peters, supra note 22, at 955.
70. See supra note 4.
71. "If the debtor sells first to another dealer, who in turn resells to a BIOC [buyer in
ordinary course], that buyer is just as innocent of knowledge about the security interest, and
the equities in her favor seem similar to those of the buyer in the three-party situation." Knapp,
supra note 4, at 884. See also Dugan, supra note 4, at 346-47.
72. Knapp, supra note 4, at 885.
73. See Dugan, supra note 4, at 362; Knapp, supra note 4, at 892; Vernon, supra note
4, at 536; Comment, Scope of Protection, supra note 4, at 996.
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Argument II illustrates the consumer protectionists' reasoning behind their
criticism of the "created by his seller" language of limitation in section 9-
307(1).
ARGUMENT II: (1) If Buyer in ordinary course purchases from a merchant
who has received and sold goods subject to a prior security
interest, Buyer again has no reason to expect that good title
will not be conveyed.
(2) Therefore, Buyer ought to take free of the security interest.
Both arguments are invalid. Both arguments depend upon the truth of
the following suppressed premise: the buyer's factual expectations ought to
control the legal risk of buyers in ordinary course. This premise is false.
The law in several circumstances leaves a buyer in ordinary course un-
fulfilled in the expectation of receiving good title. For example, neither a
merchant who acquires goods from a thief nor one who acquires goods
through wrongful sale by a bailee can pass good title to the buyer, 74 regardless
of the buyer's good faith.75 Thieves, bailees, and even lessees76 have been
held to lack even voidable title.77 So when individuals in these categories sell
goods, the true owners' prior interests take priority even over buyers in
ordinary course. The supressed premise of Arguments I and II, basing a
buyer's legal risk on his or her expectations, is false. The law has never
absolutely protected a buyer's expectation of receiving an unencumbered title
in purchased goods.
The consumer protectionists argue that analogies to section 2-403 support
a policy of extending buyer in ordinary course protection under section 9-
307(1). Section 2-403(2) provides that "any entrusting of possession of goods
to a.merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer
all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business. '78 It
envisions a bailment of goods to a merchant who in turn sells them to a
qualifying buyer. 79 An entrustment occurs, for example, if an individual gives
a merchant possession of goods for the purpose of repairing them. 0 One
74. See, e.g., Schrier v. Home Indemnity Co., 273 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1971); Johnny Dell,
Inc. v. New York State Police, 84 Misc. 2d 360, 375 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1975). For policy analysis
of the rule on transactions in stolen goods see A. ScHwAluz & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 476 (1982); Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the
Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. LEGAL STmu. 569 (1980).
75. Toyomenka, Inc. v. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 432 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1970).
76. McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 176 Ind. App. 399, 376 N.E.2d 106 (1978).
Contra United Road Machinery Co. v. Jasper, 568 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
77. "A person's title to goods is said to be voidable when he holds a legal title but his
transferor has the right to avoid the transfer and reassert title in himself." Weber, The Extension
of the Voidable Title Principle Under the Code, 49 Ky. L.J. 437, 439 (1961).
78. See supra note 46 (defining "entrusting"). See generally Note, The Good Faith Pur-
chase of Goods and "Entrusting" to a Merchant Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Section
2-403, 38 IND. L.J. 675 (1963).
79. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALEs 516 (1970).
80. See, e.g., Milnes v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 377 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Doppelt v. Wander & Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 503 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976)
(diamond entrusted to a jewelry merchant).
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of the arguments of the consumer protectionists is that since the entrusting
owner loses to a buyer in ordinary course even though the entruster never
intended to convey any title, afortiori, a secured party, who lacks complete
ownership of the goods, should lose to all buyers in ordinary course.8'
This argument, however, fails to recognize the close correlation between
sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(1).82 The "created by his seller" language in
section 9-307(1) was inserted in a 1956 revision of article 9 to conform with
section 2-403(2)'s provision that entrustment gives the dealer power to trans-
fer all rights of the entruster. 3 The proper comparison with an owner's
entrustment of goods to a merchant under section 2-403(2) is a secured
party's entrustment of collateral to a dealer of goods of the same kind under
section 9-307(1); the buyer in ordinary course prevails in both situations.8
On the other hand, if a bailee of goods were the person to entrust the
owner's goods to a dealer, a buyer in ordinary course from the dealer would
acquire only the bailee's rights under section 2-403(2), not the rights of the
owner. A buyer in ordinary course who loses under section 9-307(1) because.
the security interest was not "created by his seller" cannot achieve superior
priority through the provisions of section 2-403(2). 81 The analogy to section
81. Knapp, supra note 4, at 881.
82. See Skilton, supra note 15, at 34-35. "The correlation is not perfect. Buyers of farm
products from a farmer are not protected by section 9-307(1), whereas there is no such limitation
in section 2-403(2), once the court decides that the farmer is a 'merchant.' " Id. at 35 n.91.
"As to entrusting by a secured party, subsection (2) is limited by the more specific provisions
of section 9-307(1), which deny protection to a person buying farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations." U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 2, para. 2 (1978). In addition, the
definition of "entrusting" (section 2-403(3)) explicitly requires possession of the goods by the
merchant seller before a buyer in ordinary course can prevail under section 2-403(2), whereas
section 9-307(1) is silent on this matter. Professor Kripke has argued that the correlation between
sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(1) should be strengthened by reading a possession requirement into
section 9-307(1). Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply
Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. LAW. 153, 157 (1977). Contra Birnbaum,
Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Versus Possessory Security Interests-A
Reply to Professor Homer Kripke, 33 Bus. LAW. 2607 (1978); Gottlieb, Section 9-307(1) and
Tanbro Fabrics: A Further Response, 33 Bus. LAW. 2611 (1978).
83. The comments and recommendations of the New York Law Revision Commission
were highly influential in the amendments to the 1952 version of the UCC, including the changes
resulting in the present version of section 9-307(1). After noting that sections 9-307(1) and 2-
403(2) were "parallel provisions," the Commission's report states:
There is a further question under Sections 1-201(9), 2-403(2) and 9-307(1) whether
the sale to a buyer in ordinary course must be made by the debtor, or can be
made by a third person, who is a merchant engaged in selling goods of that kind,
if the secured party "entrusted" the goods to that third person.
LAW REvSION COMM'N, REPORT 67 (1956). The "created by his seller" language of section 9-
307(1) was added following the Commission's report. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1956
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 52-53 [here-
inafter cited as RECOMMENDATIONS].
84. Section 2-403(2) would give the buyer "all rights of the entruster," which would be
the owner's title in the goods. Section 9-307(1) would protect the buyer because the security
interest was "created by his seller."
85. Assume a secured party perfects a security interest in the debtor's tractor. The debtor
entrusts the tractor to a tractor merchant for the purpose of performing scheduled maintenance,
but the merchant wrongfully sells the tractor to a buyer in ordinary course. The buyer is
unprotected under section 9-307(1) because the security interest was not "created by his seller."
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2-403(2), rather than supporting an expanded scope of protection for buyers
under section 9-307(1), demonstrates the error in reasoning from the premise
that the legal risk of buyers in ordinary course of business under article 9
ought to be controlled by the buyer's expectations.
An additional argument based on an analogy to section 2-403 can be
advanced. Section 2-403(1) empowers a person with voidable title 6 to transfer
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. s 7 The classic case of voidable
title is the acquisition of goods by means of defrauding the owner. s8 The
argument advanced is that "[i]f the closest competing analogies under the
UCC are the robbery victim and the con man's dupe, the secured party
clearly is closer to the latter." 9 Under section 2-403(1), if the debtor's rights
in the goods were recognized as voidable title,9° then the secured party's
interest could be lost in a sale to a dealer who qualifies as a bona fide
purchaser. 9' The dealer then could pass unencumbered title to any subsequent
Under'section 2-403(2) the buyer will receive "all rights of the entruster," meaning that the
buyer is entitled to only the debtor's equity in the tractor. See J. WHnM & R. SuMyMEts, supra
note 6, at 1074-75. See also Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100
Cal. Rptr. 763 (1972). Section 2-403(2) does not serve to enhance the buyer's position against
the secured party. The debtor-entrustor's rights transferred under section 2-403(2) are encum-
bered by the secured party's interest. However, on facts similar to those of the hypothetical,
one court stated that under sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(1) the buyer in ordinary course would
prevail over a prior perfected secured party. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Western Crane &
Rigging Co., 184 Neb. 212, 215, 166 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1969). The opinion, however, is
unpersuasive. The court provides no explanation beyond mere dicta, and totally ignores the
"created by his seller" limitation of section 9-307(1) and the "all rights of his entruster"
provision of section 2-403(2).
86. Weber, supra note 77, at 439.
87. The voidable title provisions of section 2-403(1) provide as follows:
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of
purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) The transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored,
or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under
the criminal law.
88. Weber, supra note 77, at 442. "In short, when delivery in a transaction of purchase
is induced by a fraud or mistake, the 'rogue' has power to pass good title to a BFP." R.
SPEIDEL, R. SumimiSas & J. WmTE, supra note 44, at 1172.
89. Knapp, supra note 4, at 891.
90. "The voidable title doctrine stipulates that in the event the common law vests the
malefactor with voidable title, he can transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value."
Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and
Financing of Goods, 56 TEx. L. Rav. 1147, 1172 (1978).
Arguably the rule, because of its imprecision, has no appeal. See Warren, Cutting
Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 469, 475 (1963). Yet that imprecision stems not from the policy of protecting
buyers against true owners but from the difficulty of determining when the
common law clothes the malefactor with voidable title.
Id. at 1172 n.135.
91. "There is no indication, however, that this insertion [of section 2-403(1)] was intended
to broaden the protection accorded either to buyers in ordinary course under § 2-403(2) or to
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buyer based on the shelter principle that a purchaser of goods acquires all
title that the transferor had or had power to transfer. 92 Through this con-
struction, a buyer who loses to the secured party under section 9-307(1)
might find greater protection in section 2-403(1). 93
This approach is both undesirable and inappropriate. 94 The voidable title
concept is based on an estoppel theory: when an "owner transfers possession
to a buyer in such a manner as to clothe him with sufficient indicia of title
that the buyer can mislead an innocent purchaser, the owner is estopped
from asserting replevin against the buyer." '95 Comparable protection for good
faith purchasers is provided under the UCC when secured parties do not
perfect their security interest in goods96 and when sellers, rather than taking
a security interest in the goods, simply reserve title in a credit sale.97 The
situation is quite different, however, when the secured party perfects the
security interest by properly filing a financing statement. The public filing
cures the problem of ostensible ownership in nonpossessory security interests"
purchasers in general." Jackson & Peters, supra note 22, at 956 n.178. "[1It is more likely
that the drafters of the Code, having decided to emphasize the entrustment concept and having
encountered difficulties in reducing the nuisances of bona fide purchaser to statutory form,
had decided to leave the latter doctrine where it stood in the case law." McDonnell, The
Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 429, 449 (1977).
92. "A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the
interest purchased." U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978).
93. Note that under this construction, however, even a buyer in ordinary course would
lose if the debtor-seller did not qualify as a good faith purchaser. Even if section 2-403(1) were
applicable and the debtor were held to have voidable title, "the way these subsections of the
Code [(1) and (2) of § 2-403] are written, the buyer in ordinary course could not use the
entrusting sections to ripen a voidable title held by the entruster into a good title." R.
NoRDSTROM, supra note 79, at 517. The expectations of the buyer in ordinary course that are
relied upon by the consumer protectionists would be an inadequate policy basis to explain the
results even under this analysis.
94. Section 2-402(3)(a) provides that "[n]othing in this Article shall be deemed to impair
the rights of creditors of the seller under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9)." Section 9-307(1) establishes the rights of a perfected secured party vis-a-vis buyers
of goods. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) comment 1 (1978). Granting priority under section 2-403(1) to a
buyer who loses under section 9-307(1) would impair the secured party's article 9 rights. Accord,
National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967). A perplexing contra-
diction appears in the White and Summers treatise. Based on the interpretation of the National
Shawmut Bank opinion, the authors argue that a purchaser losing under section 9-307(1) should
not achieve a superior right against the security interest under section 2-403. J. WMTE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 1073-74. An accompanying note, however, indicates that Professor
Summers "would read 2-403 broadly to protect the innocent purchaser." Id. at 1074 n.100.
Reasons for the latter position are not provided.
95. Lang v. Harwood, 145 S.W.2d 945, 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
96. A secured party who does not perfect the security interest can be defeated by good
faith purchasers and lien creditors. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1978).
97. "Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest." Id. § 2-401(1).
Without filing by the seller, the security interest is unperfected and thus susceptible under
section 9-301.
98. Ostensible ownership problems arose when the common law deviated from the maxim
that possession was nine points in the law. For early case law see Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. &
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by eliminating the secret aspects of the transaction.99 The filed financing
statement removes the estoppel basis against the secured party by serving as
the surrogate for possession of the goods by the secured party.1°' It precludes
subsequent purchasers from relying on the debtor's possession of the goods
as a sufficient indicium of clear title.' 0'
Section 9-307(1) creates a specific exception to the filing requirement
.necessary to protect a secured party's interest in goods by subordinating the
perfected secured party's interest to the specified buyers in ordinary course.
The rationale for this exception has been articulated in part I of this article.
Although the public filing cures the ostensible ownership problem created
in nonpossessory secured financing of the goods, principles of apparent
authority justify precluding even a perfected secured party from prevailing
over a buyer in ordinary course. However, when a buyer in ordinary course
buys goods subject to a perfected security interest that was not "created by
his seller," the buyer lacks the basis on which to establish apparent authority
to sell. More than detrimental reliance inherent in the status of buyer in
ordinary course is needed to defeat the secured party. The section 9-307(1)
Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819). Separation of ownership and possession interests in property created
problems for ascertaining the extent of a possessor's interest. See generally Baird & Jackson,
supra note 31; Helman, Ostensible Ownership and the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 Comm.
L.J. 25 (1978).
Considerable litigation over several hundred years has led to a doctrine called
"ostensible ownership," and two major lines of authority. The first regards the
retention of possession by the seller as evidence of fraud on creditors, rebuttable
by evidence showing bona fide reasons for permitting the seller to retain possession.
Other courts regard the retention of possession as conclusive evidence of fraud
on creditors. . . . In some states, purchasers from, as well as creditors of, the
seller in possession may invoke the doctrine.
V. COUNTRYMAN, A. KAUFMAN, & Z. WISEMAN, ComRcIAL LAW 233 (2d ed. 1982).
99. "Article 9 establishes a legal rule to deal with the ostensible ownership problem secured
credit creates: The first secured party must take possession of the collateral or make a public
filing before he can shift to subsequent creditors the risk of competing claims to the same
property." Baird & Jackson, supra note 31, at 186.
100. "The filing system is, in effect, a place where secured creditors stake claims to the
debtor's property." Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 53, 62 (1983).
101. It is noteworthy that article 9 provides the perfection mechanism to cure the ostensible
ownership problem associated with secured financing, whereas other transactions creating the
same problem are not subject to the same cure. Professors Baird and Jackson have advanced
a persuasive argument that these additional transactions also should be subject to a general
requirement to cure the problem.
An ostensible ownership problem, however, exists whenever there is a separation
of ownership and possession. Article 9's treatment of the ostensible ownership
problem created by secured credit naturally leads one to ask whether the ostensible
ownership problem created by leases or other bailments is different. We believe
the answer is simple: The two ostensible ownership problems are not different in
any relevant respect. They impose the same costs on third parties, and if a filing
system is an appropriate response to the first problem, it is an equally appropriate
response to the second.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 31, at 186.
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policy analysis of the consumer protectionists gives undue weight to the
expectations of buyers in ordinary course.
The appropriate schema of the analysis requires greater consideration of
the secured party's manifestations. Argument IA better illustrates the true
reasoning behind the policy supporting the exception favoring buyers that
is codified in section 9-307(1).
ARGUMENT IA: (1) If Secured Party takes a perfected nonpossessory se-
curity interest in goods of the type comprising inventory
of the debtor, Secured Party confers apparent authority to
sell on the dealer-debtor.
(2) Therefore, a buyer in ordinary course ought to take
free of the security interest.
Argument IIA shows the true reasoning underlying the policy of the "created
by his seller" language in section 9-307(1).
ARGUMENT IIA: (1) If Secured Party takes a perfected security interest in
goods other than the type comprising inventory of the
debtor, Secured Party does not confer apparent authority
to sell on the debtor or any subsequent dealer.
(2) Therefore, a buyer in ordinary course ought not to
take free of the security interest.
The underlying premise of these arguments is as follows: the seller's
apparent authority to sell ought to control the legal risk of buyers in ordinary
course. The buyer's expectations, certainly important to section 9-307(1)
protection, are tied to the status of buyer in ordinary course. However, they
are not controlling. In focusing exclusively upon the buyer's expectations,
the consumer protectionists overlook the nature of the secured party's man-
ifestations and thereby overlook the basis to appreciate the policy that
underlies the "created by his seller" limitation.
Moreover, the dilemma of buyers in ordinary course of business who are
unprotected under section 9-307(1) is often overstated, 1°2 since these buyers
have an alternative method of protection. In contracts for the sale of goods
the seller warrants not only that the title conveyed is good and the transfer
102. Advocates of expanded protection for buyers in ordinary course argue that the buyers
unprotected by article 9 have fewer means to protect themselves than do protected buyers. A
buyer could locate a properly filed financing statement indicating a security interest created by
his seller because financing statements are indexed under the name of the debtor. On the other
hand, the buyer of encumbered goods wrongfully transferred to the buyer's dealer-seller generally
does not know the name of the debtor and thus cannot find the financing statement, even with
a thorough search of the public records. See Dugan, supra note 4, at 346-47; Knapp, supra
note 4, at 887.
The inability to locate the financing statement is an inadequate reason, however, to cut off
prior security interests in favor of buyers in ordinary course. Most noncommercial buyers are
unlikely to check the files anyway. To extend a preferred status to these buyers on the ground
that they do not have a reliable discovery method available to them, even though they would
not use it even if it were available, would be illogical.
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rightful, but also that "the goods shall be delivered free from any security
interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of
contracting has no knowledge." 103 Thus, aggrieved buyers can sue their sellers
for the loss resulting from any undisclosed perfected security interests.104
Sellers, in turn, can pass warranty of title liability to their transferors and
thereby place ultimate liability on the debtor who wrongfully sells the col-
lateral.
For the buyer of the goods who is unprotected under section 9-307(1),
the difficulty occurs when the dealer becomes insolvent and cannot pay the
breach of warranty damages. The secured party's cause of action against
the dealer for conversion'05 is also imperiled. In these circumstances, the
buyer will take whatever equity in the goods the debtor possessed,'06 the
value of the warranty claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, and any surplus
resulting from the secured party's disposition of the goods, 0 7 but the secured
party will be able to take possession of the collateral to satisfy the debt or
to hold the buyer liable for conversion. 08 Therefore, the secured party's
interests predominate.
When neither the dealer nor the dishonest debtor is available or able to
pay damages a new problem arises-how to allocate "the loss between two
innocent parties, the buyer in ordinary course and the secured party. The
next subsection of this article analyzes the issue of risk allocation in this
context.
B. Allocation of Risk
A principle the law has utilized often to allocate losses between innocent
parties is to cast the loss upon the party whose act or omission caused it.
This rule creates incentives: (1) to implement measures to eliminate or, at
least, to reduce losses, and (2) to recognize and spread as widely as possible
any resulting losses as part of the cost of engaging in the loss-causing activity.
Strict tort liability for producing and selling defective products reflects this
principle. The manufacturer who avoids negligent behavior nevertheless is
held liable for marketing a product in an unreasonably dangerous, defective
condition.109 This strict liability standard encourages producers and sellers
103. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b) (1978).
104. See, e.g., Christopher v. McGehee, 124 Ga. App. 310, 183 S.E.2d 624 (1971); American
Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., II1 N.J. Super. 322, 268 A.2d 313 (1970). See
generally R. NORDSTROM, supra note 79, §§ 58, 59.
105. First Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (1966), overruled on
other grounds, 147 N.J. Super. 212, 371 A.2d 84 (1977); McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J. Super.
505, 218 A.2d 408 (1966).
106. See Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Goodman, 24 Cal. App. 3d 131, 100 Cal. Rptr. 763
(1972).
107. When a secured party takes possession of the goods after default by the debtor and
then disposes of the goods, the secured party is required to account to the debtor for any
surplus that results from the disposition. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1978).
108. Id. § 9-307 comment 3.
109. REsTATEmENT (SacoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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to exercise additional care to ensure the safety of their products and prompts
them to pass on the cost of uneliminated losses through increased prices.
The subsequent discussion analyzes these risk allocation incentives of loss
prevention and loss spreading as justifications for shifting the loss to the
secured party in cases where the perfected security interest remains valid
against buyers in ordinary course of business.
1. Loss Prevention
The loss allocation principle based on causation is advanced as a reason
to place the loss on the secured party whenever goods serving as collateral
are purchased by a buyer in ordinary course of business. By extending credit
and permitting the debtor to possess the collateral, the secured party enables
the debtor to wrongfully pass encumbered goods along in the stream of
commerce.110 The secured party is identified as the party most responsible
for any losses suffered by subsequent buyers in ordinary course.",
Although the secured party initially facilitates the dishonest debtor's ac-
tions, that is not the only facilitation necessary for the debtor's success.
Arguably, it is not even the main cause of the subsequent loss. The debtor
may or may not have had the dishonest transfer in mind when entering into
the security agreement with the lender, but the debtor is clearly a wrongdoer
when making the improper transfer to the dealer. The dealer's conversion
of the collateral is indispensable to the buyer in ordinary course taking goods
subject to a perfected security interest. The buyer, who is something of a
wrongdoer by purchasing converted goods, also acts after the debtor's wrong-
doing. The buyer in ordinary course may be an innocent victim when he or
she buys goods subject to a continuing perfected security interest, but such
a buyer is a participating victim. Buyers certainly bear some responsibility
for selecting the merchants with whom they deal. The secured party did not
select the dealer in this instance; the buyer in ordinary course did. It is not
unreasonable to require the buyer in these circumstances to look to his or
her seller for relief when the seller is solvent.
The buyer's ability to prevent the loss is not sufficient, however, to justify
allocating the loss to the buyer when the dealer becomes insolvent and the
hoice is between the innocent buyer and the secured party." 2 Generally, the
buyer does not have access'13 to sufficient information to enable detection
110. Dugan, supra note 4, at 361.
111. See Vernon, supra note 4, at 536.
112. Contra Special Project, supra note 4, at 963-64. "The 'created by his seller' requirement
may reflect the Code's policy of placing the ultimate loss, as between two innocent parties, on
the party who dealt most closely with the 'bad guy.' " Id.
113. In the more personal commercial world of the nineteenth century courts could more
legitimately expect buyers to be more aware of the state of title of the goods they purchased.
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 28, at 470.
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of bad faith transactions in the dealer's acquisition of collateral." 4 Other
than in situations where the indications are obvious, the buyer also lacks
the ability to determine whether a particular dealer is on the verge of
insolvency. In choosing between the two innocent parties, the objective of
loss prevention does not support allocating the loss to the buyer in ordinary
course.
The objective also does not justify any further allocation of loss to secured
parties than that already codified in section 9-307(1). In most instances
secured lenders financing consumer goods and equipment lack efficient tech-
niques to control debtor misbehavior. The prohibitive cost of monitoring
collateral other than inventory precludes it as a viable option in most cases.
Imagine the expense involved in policing thousands of security interests in
relatively inexpensive consumer and business collateral located in even one
metropolitan area. The cost of sending an inspector just once to each location
of collateral would be enough to destroy the economic efficiency of policing
the collateral. Furthermore, since one inspection would be inadequate to
assure against subsequent debtor dishonesty, it would have to be repeated
regularly."' The predictable response of secured lenders operating in such
an environment would be to ignore policing mechanisms and either to with-
draw from financing equipment and consumer goods or to increase interest
charges to cover losses occurring from debtor dishonesty." 6 These alternative
responses will be discussed in greater detail,1 7 but for purposes of the present
discussion, neither of them establishes that the secured party is in a superior
position to prevent losses from debtor dishonesty.
Even if a secured lender were to monitor collateral, the policing technique
is likely to be less successful in many cases of financing consumer goods or
equipment than it is in financing inventory. Inventory financing generally
involves multiple items as collateral. By monitoring the collateral and the
debtor's treatment of the proceeds, the lender often can detect dishonesty
before all of the collateral is dissipated. When the security interest is created
in one or only a few items, as is often the case in equipment and consumer
114. "The large quantity and value of goods stolen and the nature of many fencing
operations suggest that a high percentage of the goods is ultimately resold to consumers. In
many instances, purchasers have no reason to suspect the goods' legitimacy." Weinberg, supra
note 74, at 573. See also Criminal Redistribution Systems and Their Economic Impact on Small
Business: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, Part 1, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. 2, 4-9, 44-47, 53-55, 137, 153, 161, 182, 242 (1973); id., Part 3, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
473, 486-90, 562, 698, 717, 810 (1974).
115. For a good discussion that reflects the problems and expense of adequate inspection
of inventory collateral, see Biborosch, Floor Plan Financing, 77 BAKInG L.J. 725, 736-40
(1960).
116. For a discussion of the relationship between debtor misbehavior, monitoring costs,
and secured credit, see generally Jackson & Kronman, Priorities Among Creditors, supra note
6, at 1149-58.
117. See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
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goods financing, the discovery of a wrongful transaction often comes too
late to prevent the transfer of all of the collateral.
The current format of article 9 efficiently allocates the transaction costs
of monitoring debtors' behavior."' 8 The secured party, aware that a non-
possessory security interest has been created, must announce that interest by
public filing. 19 Prospective lenders and buyers of non-inventory collateral
should protect their interests by consulting the files. It is certainly cheaper
for a dealer-buyer to check the files than it is for the secured party to
effectively monitor against wrongful transfers of collateral by a non-inventory
debtor. Section 9-307(1), however, relieves buyers in ordinary course of the
costs of monitoring against security interests created by their dealer-sellers.
Because these secured parties finance goods intended for sale in ordinary
course and because most of them have authorized the sale of the inventory
collateral, buyers are not required to check the files before each purchase
to identify the lender or to verify the debtor's authority to sell. 20 Monitoring
debtors with relatively few inventory financers is more efficient than requiring
all buyers to police the transactions. 2 ' Section 9-307(1) recognizes that with-
out the apparent authority concept behind inventory financing, the ordinary
channels of commerce would become hopelessly clogged.
In transactions in which the perfected security interest is not created by
the buyer's seller, the party acquiring the goods from the debtor is in the
best position to prevent the loss. 22 Proper reliance on the filing system
reveals to a dealer receiving goods from a debtor that the goods are encum-
bered.' 23 The secured party and the subsequent buyer can each pass any loss
from a wrongful transfer to the dealer-the secured party by an action for
conversion and the buyer by an action for breach of warranty of title.
Neither of these parties, however, appears to be in a superior position to
118. "Neither the acquisition and dissemination of information about competing property
claims nor the assumption of the risk of an undiscovered superior property claim is costless."
Baird & Jackson, supra note 31, at 188.
119. U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9-401, 9-402 (1978).
120. The article 9 filing system adopts the system of "notice filing," so the location of a
financing statement in the public files does not necessarily provide an accurate indication of
the relationship between the alleged debtor and secured party. "The notice itself indicates merely
that the secured party who has filed may have a security interest in the collateral described.
Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete state of
affairs." Id. § 9-402 comment 2, para. 1. See 1 0. GILMoRE, SECURITY INTEREsTs IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY §§ 15.2-15.3 (1965).
121. Dolan, supra note 28, at 1180. Cf. id. at 1171 (discussing section 2-403(2): "Most
often, buyers deal with more merchants, true owners with fewer; and buyers generally deal
with their merchant sellers on an infrequent or casual basis, the true owner enjoying a more
permanent relationship with his merchants.").
122. "The availability of reliable information about the debtor's property reduces the
debtor's incentive to misbehave by removing opportunities to do so." Baird & Jackson, supra
note 31, at 182.
123. An exception to this proposition follows from the provision of section 9-302(l)(d)
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hold the dealer. In the event that the dealer and the wrongful debtor are
both insolvent, the loss is allocated between the secured party and the buyer.
The rationale of loss prevention has limited utility in this context. The
buyer in ordinary course generally cannot detect the conversions by a dealer
or foresee a dealer's insolvency problems. In cases of non-inventory fi-
nancing, allocation of loss to secured parties would create incentives to raise
interest costs or to abandon financing. Measures taken by secured parties
to prevent losses generally would be too expensive to be cost efficient. The
loss prevention rationale justifies the current risk allocation to secured parties
financing inventory, but it is not helpful in deciding which of the two innocent
parties should bear the risk of loss in cases of non-inventory financing.
2. Loss Spreading
"[The most desirable system of loss distribution under a strict resource-
allocation theory is one in which the prices of goods [or services] accurately
reflect their full cost to society.' '1 24 Losses resulting from activities are
considered to be part of the true costs of those activities, 125 and the loss
spreading theory requires the loss to be borne by the party or enterprise in
the best position to reflect the loss in its prices. 26 Loss spreading thus is
achieved by allocating the loss to an enterprise that can pass along the cost
in the form of higher prices. 27 The principle is to lessen the impact by
spreading the burden to more people and over longer periods of time. 28 In
the context of secured financing, the lending institution is the entity that
arguably should internalize the costs of unavoidable losses resulting from
its lending activities. 29
that allows automatic perfection for purchase money security interests in consumer goods. For
an analysis on the cost-effectiveness of the provision, see Baird & Jackson, supra note 31, at
192-93. Secured lenders should be cautious in relying upon automatic perfection since the failure
to file exposes them to a loss of priority under section 9-307(2). This section does not aid a
dealer acquiring the consumer goods from the debtor, however, since it only "protects the
buyer of consumer goods from another consumer ... " Everett Nat'l Bank v. Deschuiteneer,
109 N.H. 112, 115, 244 A.2d 196, 198 (1968).
124. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 505 (1961).
125. Id. See also Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rav.
359, 382-83, 386 (1951); James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative
Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 537, 538 (1952); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing
Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172, 1173-74 (1952).
126. Calabresi, supra note 124, at 500-01; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration
of Risk (1), 38 YALE L.J. 584, 586 (1929); Gregory, supra note 125, at 383; James, supra note
125, at 538; Morris, supra note 125, at 1172, 1176.
127. Calabresi, supra note 124, at 505.
128. Id. at 517.
129. See Dugan, supra note 4, at 351; Knapp, supra note 4, at 890; Comment, Scope of
Protection, supra note 4, at 994.
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However, just as the financing institution is not the exclusive cause of
losses incurred by buyers in ordinary course who are unprotected under
section 9-307(1),13° it also is not the only enterprise capable of spreading
losses through its price structure. The dealer again appears to be the entity
better able to absorb the liability and to distribute losses incurred by buyers
in ordinary course. Resource allocation theory recognizes the cost to society
caused by sales of goods with defective title as surely as it recognizes the
costs from debtor misbehavior in nonpossessory secured financing. Partic-
ipants in both situations should be aware of the risk of transfer of encum-
bered goods, but the cost of protecting against the risk by checking the
public files is less for the dealer.
Again, the difficult issue is how the risk of loss should be allocated between
the innocent parties when neither the wrongdoing debtor nor the converting
dealer is available as a solvent defendant. As between the buyer and the
secured party, the choice under loss spreading is clear, since the buyer does
not have an opportunity to distribute the loss to anyone. However, before
embracing this theory and shifting the loss to secured parties in all cases of
unrecoverable loss by buyers in ordinary course of business, the consequences
of loss spreading should be analyzed.
Business practices associated with inventory financing provide clues as to
how the financing community would respond to an expansion of its risk of
losing additional security interests in goods to buyers in ordinary course.
Most commmercial finance houses do not find inventory financing desira-
ble.' The demands and expense of monitoring and the burden and reduced
value of inventory in forced sales following default limit the attractiveness
of inventory as a form of collateral. 3 2 The fact that buyers in ordinary
course can cut off the inventory security interest also contributes to the lack
of enthusiasm for inventory financing. Commercial lenders generally prefer
to wait until the dealer sells some of the inventory so that they can take
the initial security interest in the personal property realized from the sale,
such as accounts receivable, instruments or chattel paper. 3 3 The lender's
130. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
131. "Inventory is at best a secondary class of collateral; it is generally used only when
the debtor's accounts are insufficient to support the needed advance." Scult, Accounts Re-
ceivable Financing: Operational Patterns Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 ARmZ. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1969). See also Coogan & Gordan, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HAsv. L.
REV. 1529, 1567 (1963); Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds,
and Priorities, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 716-17 (1966).
132. Reisman, What the Commercial Lawyer Should Know About Commercial Finance
and Factoring, 79 COM. L.J. 146, 150 (1974).
133. "Accounts receivable are, by their nature, self-liquidating, and represent far better
security than inventory which, as raw materials or finished goods, requires a knowledge of the
borrower's industry, timing, and sometimes a great deal of effort to convert to cash." Scult,
supra note 131, at 28-29 n.168.
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interest is then in a form of collateral that can be more accurately valued,
and the risks involved with obsolete merchandise, returned goods, forced
sales, and loss of security interest to good faith purchasers are limited or
eliminated. 34 So serious are the risks and the problems in controlling in-
ventory that most commercial lenders limit their advances to approximately
"twenty to forty per cent of cost, depending upon the quality and nature
of the inventory,"' 35 but they will advance approximately eighty-five percent
for accounts receivable. 36 The adoption of a rule that would cut off security
interests in consumer goods or equipment when purchased by buyers in
ordinary course would dampen significantly the viability of using these forms
of collateral for secured financing.
Many lenders finance a dealer's inventory only as a means to profit from
purchasing chattel paper 3 7 created by sales of the inventory. The finance
charges customers pay on chattel paper generally have fallen outside the
usury laws. 38 To achieve access to this highly profitable paper, lending
institutions finance the inventory floor plan of dealers, who in turn agree
to discount all or most of their chattel paper with the lender. 39
If the "created by his seller" limitation of section 9-307(1) were deleted,
secured financing of consumer goods and equipment would be substantially
impaired. A reduction in the percentage of the cost of collateral that lenders
are willing to finance would require businessmen to tie up more of their
capital in equipment. Consumers would have to defer purchases until they
could accumulate larger downpayments. 14 Combined with these limits on
the extent of financing, the inevitable increase in interest charges would serve
to put secured financing beyond the reach of many consumers and busi-
134. Reisman, supra note 132, at 150. Some economists refer to receivables as " 'near
money' "; some borrowers prefer receivables "because they represent the next to last stage in
the cash-to-cash cycle." Coogan & Gordon, supra note 131, at 1529-30.
135. Reisman, supra note 132, at 151.
136. Scult, supra note 131, at 28-29 n.168.
137. "Chattel paper" means
a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security
interest in or a lease of specific goods. . . .When a transaction is evidenced both
by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a series of
instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper.
U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1978).
138. R. SPEIDEL, R. Suhimps & J. W=T, supra note 44, at 210.
139. "In floor planning, the return on chattel paper is often the tail that wags the dog."
Id. at 211.
140. Comparisons with other legal systems can provide some indications. Although the
differences in large part are attributable to differing economic and political conditions, the law
and legal institutions also affect the availability of commercial and consumer credit. See
Kozolchyk, Law and the Credit Structure in Latin America, 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1969). "In
Mexico, a country which is frequently pictured as a model of political and economic development
in Latin America, household appliances such as refrigerators, washing machines, television sets
and even bicycles are still regarded as luxuries available to lower middle class and poor families
only on a cash basis." Id. at 1.
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nesses.14' The current chokehold that high interest rates have applied to
business and consumer activities suggests the devastating effect that addi-
tional upward pressure on interest rates would have on national economic
recovery.
The reaction from many lenders would be even more drastic. Predictably,
they would simply refuse to finance transactions with non-inventory goods
as the collateral. With increased risk for the lender, but without possible
attractive incentives like the purchase of chattel paper, prospective borrowers
would have a more difficult time enticing lenders to finance on the security
of borrowers' goods. Consumer goods and equipment are not supposed to
be sold, but when they are, through an improper sale by the debtor, the
secured party's risk in the proceeds from such a sale is often greater than
it is in proceeds from the sale of inventory. The security interest continues
in any proceeds received by the debtor, but only if they are identifiable. 42
The requirement of identification is easily met in sales of inventory which
produce accounts receivable, chattel paper, or promissory notes. Cash and
checks which can be converted promptly to cash are typical proceeds from
sales of non-inventory goods. Cash is extremely vulnerable to prompt dis-
sipation by the debtor, and unlikely to be kept separately identifiable. Lenders
financing non-inventory goods are likely to demand more secure forms of
collateral, such as real property, pledges of valuables, or commercial paper.
These demands would preclude a large number of society's secured credit
transactions.
Strict resource allocation theory clearly places the loss on the secured
party. It recognizes the loss as a true cost of the lending activity and requires
it to be recognized by the lending institution. The effect of this rule is to
spread the loss among all borrowers from the enterprise, rather than allowing
the loss to rest solely on the innocent buyer-victim.
Despite this theoretical justification for shifting losses to secured parties,
the loss allocation system codified in section 9-307(1) is preferable. Every
system should be analyzed in terms of its probable consequences as well as
its theoretical basis, and it is in these terms that the section 9-307(1) approach
does prevail. Quite frankly, the availability of financing, upon which so
many people in our society depend, is subsidized in part by the occasional
losses suffered by innocent good faith buyers purchasing goods from ap-
parently reputable and financially sound dealers. Most of those purchasers
are protected, but occasionally the buyer in ordinary course of business will
lose to a secured party or to a prior owner who claims wrongful loss of th
goods through bailment, lease, or theft. The loss of the buyer in ordinary
141. "Secured financing is of prime importance to the survival and growth of small and
medium-sized businesses, and frequently is the only means whereby such enterprises can obtain
working capital when neither risk capital nor unsecured credit is available in sufficient quan-
tities." Scult, supra note 131, at 1.
142. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978).
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course clearly is unfortunate. However, the misfortune of a few buyers is
not sufficient to justify expanding buyer protection against secured parties
when such expansion would lead to increased credit charges and withdrawal
of secured financing of non-inventory goods.
III. APPLICATION OF THE POLICY
Even though a literal application of the "created by his seller" language
often produces the correct result under section 9-307(l), many situations can
raise unique issues that are rationally answerable only with the guidance of
the underlying policy objectives of the provision. This section of the article
addresses four of those situations. The discussion does not exhaust all of
the possible issues, but it does demonstrate both the need for policy ori-
entation and the workability of the policy articulated in part I of this article.
Case 1
A secured party finances the purchase of a major appliance by a debtor.
The debtor is a dealer in the business of selling similar appliances, but rather
than buying this appliance as inventory, the debtor buys it either as consumer
goods for personal use or as equipment for business use. Subsequently, the
debtor wrongfully transfers the appliance to the inventory of the dealership
and sells it to a buyer in ordinary course of business. Who prevails in a
priority dispute between the secured party and the buyer in ordinary course?
The "created by his seller" limitation precludes the buyer from taking
free of the security interest in all cases in which the dealer is someone other
than the debtor who created the security interest. Under the hypothetical
posed here, however, the consumer goods or equipment are moved to the
debtor's own inventory. 43 A literal application of the statutory language
143. Comment 2, para. 1 to section 9-307 appropriately points out that subsection (1)
applies "primarily to inventory." Prior to 1956, section 9-307(1) read as follows:
In the case of inventory, and in the case of goods as to which the secured party
files a financing statement in which he claims interest in proceeds, a buyer in
ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest even though perfected
and even though the buyer knows of the terms of the security agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1952).
In support of the change to the current version of the subsection, the Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code noted: "The former opening. language has been omitted because
the definition of 'buyer in ordinary course of business' limits subsection (1) to inventory cases."
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 83, at 284. Another commentator already has pointed out that
"the stated reason is argumentative and not completely satisfying." Skilton, supra note 15, at
13.
In addition to the concerns of the New York Law Revision Commission indicated supra
note 83, the Commission also expressed concern about the correlation between section 2-403(2)
and the prior codification of section 9-307(1) since section 2-403(2) appeared to apply to a
broader category of goods: "Section 9-307(1) is confusing in applying only to 'inventory' or
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would lead courts always to rule in favor of the buyer in ordinary course
in this type of case because the security interest was "created by his seller."
The policy of the "created by his seller" language is to limit the section
9-307(1) exception to cases in which the secured party has clothed the debtor
with the indicia of either apparent authority to sell the goods or apparent
ownership of them. 44 Both apparent authority and apparent ownership are
based on estoppel of the secured party. 45 Thus, the policy of section 9-
307(1) is advanced by protecting buyers in ordinary course when a secured
party finances goods that are transferred improperly to the debtor's inven-
tory, because the estoppel element that gives rise to apparent authority and
apparent ownership 4 6 is satisfied in the Case 1-type situation. The secured
party has entrusted the goods to a person with the inherent power to sell
them directly to a buyer in ordinary course.
One basic fact distinguishes the Case 1-type situation from straightforward
inventory financing-the secured party finances the goods for use other than
their sale as inventory. Note, however, that even an express prohibition
against transfer of the collateral to the debtor's inventory would not effec-
tively protect the secured party's interest. Section 9-307(1) applies only to
cases in which debtors disregard express limitations on their authority to
sell; a secured party authorizing the transfer to inventory would lose the
security interest upon subsequent sale under section 9-306(2).
The decision in Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 147 however, raises
a relevant issue under section 2-403(2), the entrustment provision of article
2 that is the correlate to section 9-307(1). 14 The court held that mere en-
trustment of the goods to a merchant is not enough alone to invoke section
2-403(2) protection for the buyer; the owner also must know that the person
to whom the goods are transferred is a dealer. 149 The court in Weisberg thus
read into that section a knowledge element that does not appear in the
language of the Code. 50 The estoppel principle underlying section 2-403(2)
supports the result in Weisberg and is equally applicable to section 9-307(1).
to goods as to which the.secured party files a financing statement claiming proceeds [referencing
the pre-1956 version of the subsection] since the parallel provisions of Section 2-403(2) are
broad enough to cut off a security interest in any goods." LAw REvIsIoN CoMM'N, REPORT,
supra note 83, at 67.
144. See supra notes 43-52, 57-68, and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 62.
146. See supra notes 43-46, 56, and accompanying text.
147. 54 Misc. 2d 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967).
148. See supra notes 45-46, 82-83, and accompanying text.
149. 54 Misc. 2d at 171, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
150. Some commentators have suggested that the approach adopted in the Weisberg opinion
is appropriate. R. BRAUCHER, DoculMNTs OF TITLE 66 (1958); 2 G. GILmoRE, supra note 5,
§ 26.8. Other commentators have adopted a contrary position. Skilton, supra note 15, at 38-
39; Warren, supra note 28, at 473-74 (concerned that "a simple, easy-to-apply rule" will become
"mired down in a tedious factual inquiry"); see also infra notes 152-55 and accompanying
text.
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The rationale behind estoppel is that persons, to be estopped, must say or
do something that they know or should know can induce detrimental reliance
on the part of another person.' 5' Merely doing the act-such as giving up
possession of goods while retaining ownership or a perfected security interest-
is not enough. To the extent that sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(1) are applied
only on the basis of a secured party's act, without regard to what
the actor knew or should have known, the estoppel principle is abandoned
and the section is construed on the basis of an absolute rule of risk allocation.
That approach would be inconsistent with the policy underlying section 9-
307(1), and thus would violate legislative intent.
One commentator has opined that perhaps section 9-307(1) should be more
liberally construed to favor buyers, in circumstances like those presented in
Case 1, on the grounds that typical secured parties are professional lenders
who should bear the risk of loss. 52 The commentator states that "[s]ection
9-307(1) may be viewed as a further step in an orderly progression from
common law and statutory antecedents, not subject to implied limitations
based on common law estoppel considerations."'' 5 Because the consumer-
buyer is a legitimate beneficiary of the law's concern and protection, the
author asks, "Is he not entitled to invoke section 9-307(1) without our reading
in qualifications adverse to him?' ' 54
The argument is essentially an eloquent suggestion-that we fall back on
literal application of the statutory language in Case 1-type situations. The
law on the matter arguably has evolved into its current form, which can be
determined from the words in the statute. But this literal approach leaves
us floundering for supportive policy. Why protect consumer-buyers in Case
1-type circumstances but deny similar protection for a consumer-buyer when
the security interest was not "created by his seller"? The better approach
is to remain consistent with the estoppel principle and the related apparent
authority rationale and to recognize that most secured parties will not prevail
under Case 1 fact patterns. The forseeability of these facts suggests that
professional lenders should make reasonable efforts to determine the busi-
nesses of their debtors so that, in most instances, the secured party at least
should know when the debtor is a dealer who deals in goods like the
collateral.1ss
151. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 42 (1973).
152. Skilton, supra note 15, at 37-38.
153. Id. at 38.
154. Id. at 39.
155. Occasionally, however, a case will arise in which the secured party cannot be estopped.
One of the cases discussed by Professor Skilton appears to be just such a case. In Michigan
Nat'l Bank v. Grandberry, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) the
court decided in favor of the buyer on the following facts:
R.C. Moore, Jr. testified [for the secured party] that Boales [the seller] was not
in the business of selling house trailers, but that he rented house trailers. Moore
knew that Boales had some six or eight house trailers in his backyard at Collierville,
09841
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Case 2
A secured party perfects a security interest in the debtor's inventory of
stereo equipment. The debtor subsequently sells a stereo system to a customer
who qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course. When the debtor-dealer defaults
on several payments, the secured party traces possession of the stereo system
to a neighbor who bought it from the buyer in ordinary course.
Even though the secured party loses if pitted against the buyer in ordinary
course, a literal application of section 9-307(1) sustains the secured party's
position against the neighbor because the security interest was created by
the debtor-dealer and not by the neighbor's seller. Furthermore, the neighbor
does not qualify as a buyer in ordinary course because the seller in the
transaction was not in the business of selling goods of that kind. Nevertheless,
the security interest was cut off in the initial sale, and the secured party
would receive an unmerited windfall if the security interest were allowed to
revive following the purely fortuitous subsequent sale. Having created ap-
parent authority in the dealer-debtor to sell the goods free of the security
interest, the secured party seemingly should not be allowed to reassert the
interest based solely upon the subsequent disposition of the goods by the
buyer in ordinary course.
The Fifth Circuit, in Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp.,'5 6
properly held that a subsequent purchaser from a buyer in ordinary course
takes free of the perfected security interest. 57 Protection for the subsequent
purchaser is attained through the shelter provision of section 2-403(1). That
section grants to a purchaser of goods "all title which his transferor had or
had power to transfer." The buyer in ordinary course took good title under
section 9-307(1) and transferred that title through the shelter provision to
Tennessee, and that Boales had some house trailers on a lot at Red Bank,
Mississippi. Moore testified these trailers were occupied by tenants. Moore proved
he charged retail sales tax on the sale to Boales, which he said he would not have
charged had Boales been a retailer of house trailers.
Id. at 194. The fact that the appellee-buyer was "twenty-seven years of age with a fifth
grade formal education . . . [was] married and ha[d] six children," id. at 195, may well have
been decisive in influencing the outcome in favor of the buyer. Unquestionably, however, the
court's statement of the policy objective of section 9-307(1) is incomplete and inadequate:
"[t]he purpose of [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 47-9-307 is to protect a buyer in ordinary course of
business." Id. Professor Skilton already has identified the disturbing aspects of the decision:
There is little or nothing to indicate that the secured party should have known
he was lending to one in the business of selling goods of that kind, and the buyer
admitted that he did not know whether he was dealing with a dealer. And the
case is not particularly strong on the basic point that the seller must in fact be
one in the business of selling goods of that kind.
Skilton, supra note 15, at 40 n.102. Not surprisingly, commentators writing from the consumer
protectionist perspective are not disturbed by the Grandberry decision. Knapp, supra note 4,
at 875 n.81.
156. 681 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1982).
157. Id. at 377.
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the subsequent purchaser. The court responded with cogent precision to the
assertion that this approach violates the rule that section 2-403 cannot be
used to evade the limitations of section 9-307(1).
But the rule is that section 2.403(a) [U.C.C. § 2-403(1)] is not available
to save one who buys when the seller's title is subject to a security interest
but who does not qualify under section 9.307(a) [U.C.C. § 9-307(1)]. It
certainly does not mean that section 2.403(a) is not available to subse-
quent transferees from a successful section 9.307(a) buyer .... If General
Dynamics were correct, section 9.307(a) would be of scant benefit to the
"protected" buyer in the ordinary course, for good title means little if
one cannot transfer it.1'5
It is essential to recognize the policy relationship between sections 9-307(1)
and 9-306(2). Standing alone, section 9-307(1) grants priority to the buyer
in ordinary course from security interests "created by his seller." However,
recognizing the apparent authority in the dealer-debtor and thereby cutting
off the security interest under section 9-307(1) upon the initial sale to the
buyer in ordinary course also breaks the continuity of the secured party's
interest envisioned under section 9-306(2). That section provides that "[e]xcept
where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in col-
lateral notwithstanding sale. .... ,,159 With the security interest discontinued
under section 9-307(1) upon sale of the collateral to a buyer in ordinary
course, the Code does not recognize any basis for automatic reattachment.
The only way the secured party can reacquire a security interest in the goods
sold is to enter into a new security agreement with a person who has an
interest in the goods.60
Case 3
A used-car dealer assigns the title to an automobile on its lot to one of
its salesmen. The salesman (debtor) uses the title to secure a loan from a
bank (secured party), and the latter perfects the security interest. The bank
knows the debtor is a used-car salesman. The debtor-salesman wrongfully
reassigns the title to the dealer who then sells the automobile to a buyer in
ordinary course of business. When the bank learns of the sale it seeks to
replevy the automobile from the buyer.
158. Id. at 377. An addition to the court's opinion that would be helpful is a reference
to Code authority for its position that the subsequent sale could not resurrect the security
interest of the lender. Most commentators that have addressed the issue have advocated the
approach taken in Gary Aircraft, but likewise have not supported the claim of nonrevival with
adequate Code authority. Knapp, supra note 4, at 884; Skilton, supra note 15, at 76; Comment,
Scope of Protection, supra note 4, at 989. Another source discusses but does not resolve the
issue. Special Project, supra note 4, at 962-63 n.642.
159. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978) (emphasis added).
160. Id. § 9-203(l)(a).
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The buyer's position under section 9-307(1) is inferior to the bank's because
the security interest was not "created by his seller." The buyer's case would
not be improved even if the debtor-salesman made the actual sale. The sale
then would have been made on behalf of the dealer, the seller for purposes
of the transaction, but the security interest was created by the debtor-
salesman in his individual capacity. If the sale somehow were held to be on
behalf of the debtor-salesman, the buyer then could not qualify as a "buyer
in ordinary course of business" because a personal sale by the salesman
from the dealer's car lot would not be "in ordinary course."' 6'
One court has held on similar facts, however, that the buyer in ordinary
course prevails over the perfected secured party. In Adams v. City National
Bank & Trust Co.,' 62 the court clearly recognized the limitation imposed
through the "created by his seller" language.
Under a strict construction of Article 9, the only way Adams as a
buyer could receive the protection of § 9-307 would be for this court to
find Clanton, as a used car salesman and owner of [sic] Ford was the
actual "seller" who "created" the security interest, or if we would find
dealer as "seller", "created" the security interest through his agent
Clanton. Both of these circumventive tactics are exercises in legal gym-
nastics. ,63
Rejecting both of these "circumventive tactics," the court adopted another
one. It simply ruled in conclusory fashion: "[flor the purpose of this decision
under § 9-307, we find the same entity created the security interest and sold
the Ford."' 64 The court ignored the limiting effect of the "created by his
seller" language by insisting that "[w]hether Dealer or Clanton, his salesman,
created the security interest should not be the controlling factor."' 6
The Adams decision is devoid of policy support. When a debtor grants
a security interest in consumer goods and wrongfully transfers them to a
dealer for sale to a buyer in ordinary course, the secured party has not
created apparent authority for the sale and the security interest should remain
intact. The secured party's knowledge that the debtor is a salesman-employee
of a dealer who sells similar goods is not enough to create the estoppel
element underlying apparent authority. Unlike the situation in Case I where
consumer goods were wrongfully transferred into the debtor's own inventory,
the debtor here has transferred them to a dealer before the buyer purchased
in ordinary course. The secured party who knows or should know that the
debtor is a dealer in the type of goods financed is estopped in a Case 1-
type situation because he entrusted goods to a debtor who personally can
sell the goods to a buyer in ordinary course.
161. See Warren, supra note 28, at 473 n.22.
162. 565 P.2d 26 (Okla. 1977).
163. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
164. Id. at 31.
165. Id. at 30.
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In addition, the buyer's position in the Adams case cannot be bolstered
by an agency theory. The facts clearly demonstrate that the salesman was
not acting as the dealer's agent in creating the security interest. Title to the
automobile was assigned to the salesman and then reassigned to the dealer
after the acquisition of financing. The dealer and salesman undoubtedly
carried out the plan to deceive the lender. The facts do not suggest any
basis for the bank to know that the salesman was acting as the principal
on behalf of the dealer. The employment relationship alone is not a sufficient
basis because activities in the normal scope of responsibilities of used-car
salesmen do not include obtaining secured financing on a single automobile
whose title has been assigned to the salesman. The contract embodied in the
security agreement between the bank and the salesman was between those
two parties only.
Case 4
A secured party acquires and perfects a security interest in a debtor's new
automobile. The debtor defaults on several payments and the secured party
takes possession of the automobile. Lacking the facilities to safeguard it
adequately prior to arranging a sale, the secured party contracts with an
automobile dealer who sells new and used cars to store the vehicle on the
dealer's premises. The dealer later wrongfully sells the automobile to a buyer
in ordinary course of business, and the secured party now seeks to replevy
it.
Application of section 9-307(1) to these facts creates an undesirable result.
Because the buyer in ordinary course purchased goods subject to a security
interest that was not "created by his seller" (the automobile dealer) but by
the debtor (the original purchaser of the automobile), section 9-307(1) does
not cut off the, security interest in favor of the buyer. Nevertheless, the
secured party clearly established apparent authority to sell by placing the
goods directly in the hands of a dealer who sells goods of the same kind.
This entrustment empowers the dealer to pass the goods directly to a buyer
in ordinary course.
On similar facts, a court has held that the secured party's rights are
governed by section 2-403(2) rather than section 9-307(1). In Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Associates Discount Corp., 166 the secured party argued that
the terms "entrustment" and "entruster" in sections 2-403(2) and 2-403(3)
apply only to inventory financing and that its rights as a "lien creditor"
through section 2-403(4)67 are governed exclusively under section 9-307(1). 161.
166. 246 Ark. 118, 436 S.W.2d 809 (1969).
167. "The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by the
Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Documents of Title
(Article 7)." U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (1978).
168. 246 Ark. at 126, 436 S.W.2d at 812.
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The court disagreed.
We do not agree with Commercial's [secured party's] theory that its
rights as a lien creditor with respect to repossessed property have been
removed from subsection (2) and (3) of § 85-2-403 [U.C.C. § 2-403]. It
clearly had possession with the right to transfer title without a certificate
of title, and as pointed out by the committee comment [U.C.C. § 2-403
comment 2, para. 1], has no right to complain, whether it be considered
as a consignor or a lender with a security interest, for the very purpose
of placing goods in inventory is to turn them into cash by sale. Therefore,
we think that the entrustment of possession is most applicable to a
repossessing lien holder with right of sale. 69
The holding is correct and the relationship between sections 2-403(2) and
9-307(1) is left intact, although an explanation beyond the court's analysis
is desirable. The secured party in this case entrusted possession of the
automobile on two separate occasions: to the original purchaser under the
financing agreement, and to the automobile dealer for storage following
repossession from the purchaser. With the debtor in possession of the col-
lateral, the secured party eliminated the ostensible ownership problem by-
perfecting the security interest. The entrustment transaction with the
automobile dealer stands in a different light. The storage arrangement created
a bailor-bailee relationship, precisely the type of transaction in goods con-
templated by section 2-403(2), and it was not a secured transaction under
article 9. The fact that the entrustor's rights in the goods were limited to a
security interest to satisfy the debtor's outstanding obligation, rather than
full ownership, is irrelevant. Entrustment to a merchant who is in the business
of selling similar automobiles gives the merchant "power to transfer all
rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." Entrust-
ment to the merchant, although for purposes limited to a bailment, creates
apparent authority for the merchant to sell the goods under section 2-403(2).
A secured party who repossesses goods as collateral from a defaulting debtor
cannot use section 9-307(1) as a shield from the consequences of section 2-
403(2) if he subsequently entrusts the repossessed goods to a merchant who
wrongfully sells them to a qualifying buyer in ordinary course.
CONCLUSION
The article 9 general rule of continued validity of security interests in
goods despite their sale by the debtor is subject to two important exceptions
tied to secured party authorization of the sale. Express authorization ter-
minates the security interest under section 9-306(2) and a buyer in ordinary
169. Id. at 126, 436 S.W.2d at 813.
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course of business takes free of security interests "created by his seller,"
even in the absence of express authority for the disposition, under section
9-307(1). The "created by his seller" language serves to limit the latter
exception to those cases in which the secured party has clothed the debtor
with the indicia of apparent authority to sell the goods. Fundamental prin-
ciples of agency law provide support for this limitation. Nonpossessory
inventory financing establishes apparent authority to sell to buyers in or-
dinary course because: (1) the sale is facilitated by entrusting the collateral
to dealer-debtors in the business of selling goods of the kind comprising the
collateral, (2) the intended result of inventory collateral is sale to third
persons, and (3) most of these sales are made pursuant to actual secured
party authorization.
Thus, the policy underlying the "created by his seller" language is dis-
coverable within the relationship of the two exceptions to the article 9 general
rule of continued validity of security interests. It is a limitation that serves
to correlate the section 9-307(1) exception with the more explicit authorization
exception in section 9-306(2); secured party authorization for the sale of the
collateral, whether actual or apparent, is the policy basis for discontinuing
the security interest in the collateral after its sale by the debtor.
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